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Abstract
In the random assignment problem, objects are randomly assigned to agents
keeping in view the agents’ preferences over objects. A random assignment
specifies the probability of an agent getting an object. We examine the struc-
tural and computational aspects of ex post efficiency of random assignments. We
first show that whereas an ex post efficient assignment can be computed easily,
checking whether a given random assignment is ex post efficient is NP-complete.
Hence implementing a given random assignment via deterministic Pareto opti-
mal assignments is NP-hard. We then formalize another concept of efficiency
called robust ex post efficiency that is weaker than stochastic dominance effi-
ciency but stronger than ex post efficiency. We present a characterization of
robust ex post efficiency and show that it can be tested in polynomial time if
there are a constant number of agent types. It is shown that the well-known
random serial dictatorship rule is not robust ex post efficient. Finally, we show
that whereas robust ex post efficiency depends solely on which entries of the as-
signment matrix are zero/non-zero, ex post efficiency of an assignment depends
on the actual values.
Keywords: Random assignment, efficiency
JEL: C62, C63, and C78
Pareto optimality has been termed the “single most important tool of nor-
mative economic analysis” [20]. It appeals to the idea that there should not
exist another possible outcome different from the social outcome which all the
agents prefer. We consider Pareto optimality in the random assignment problem
which is a fundamental and widely applicable setting in computer science and
economics [see e.g., 23, 13, 17, 11, 14, 6].
In a random assignment problem (N,O,%), there is a set of agents N =
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{1, . . . , n}, a set of objects O = {o1, . . . , on}, and a preference profile %= (%1
, . . . ,%n) that specifies for each agent i ∈ N his strict preferences over objects
in O. The goal is to find a desirable assignment keeping in view the preferences
of the agents. A random assignment which we will simply refer to as assignment
assigns the probability of agents getting objects. A random assignment can be
represented as a bistochastic matrix in which each entry denotes the probability
of an agent getting an object. Since both the probability of an agent getting
some object and the probability that an object is allocated to some agent is
one, each column and row of the random assignment matrix sums up to one.
A deterministic assignment is a random assignment in which the probability
of an agent getting an object is either one or zero. The advantage of using
random assignments instead of deterministic assignments is that they can allow
for better ex ante fairness. It is well-known that any random assignment can
be a result of a probability distribution over deterministic assignments [12].
A random assignment also a useful time-sharing interpretation whereby the
probability of agent i getting object o is the fraction of time he will be matched
to object o [see e.g., 21, 14].
In this paper, we focus on efficiency of random assignments. A deterministic
assignment p is Pareto optimal if there exists no other deterministic assignment
q such that each agent weakly prefers his object allocated in assignment q and
at least one agent strictly prefers his object allocated in assignment q. When
the assignment is random, Pareto optimality can be generalized to two well-
studied efficiency concepts — ex post efficiency and stochastic dominance (SD)
efficiency. A random assignment is ex post efficient if it can be represented as
a convex combination of Pareto optimal deterministic assignments. A random
assignment is SD-efficient is there exists no other random assignment which
each agent weakly prefers and some agent strictly prefers with respect to the
stochastic dominance relation. Ex post efficiency is a weaker requirement than
stochastic dominance (SD) efficiency [17].
The main research problem in this paper is to understand the structure and
complexity of efficient assignments in particular ex post efficiency assignments.
We not only consider ex post efficiency and SD-efficiency but also introduce
an intermediate notion called robust ex post efficiency that is weaker than SD-
efficiency and stronger than ex post efficiency. We seek to understand the geom-
etry of the ex post efficient polytope and where the robust ex post efficient and
SD-efficient points lie within the ex post efficient polytope or the assignment
polytope. An efficiency concept is deemed combinatorial if the efficiency of an
assignment solely depends on which entries of the assignment matrix are zero
or non-zero. We explore which of the efficiency concepts are combinatorial. We
also consider natural computational problems related to efficiency of random
assignments. Previously, computational aspects of Pareto optimal determinis-
tic assignments have been studied in great depth in recent years [3, 9, 19, 4].
Similar analysis has been done for SD-efficient assignments where it has been
shown that not only can an SD-efficient random assignment be computed effi-
ciently [13], a linear programming formulation can be used to check whether an
assignment is SD-efficient or not [5]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
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the complexity of testing ex post efficiency has not been settled. Testing ex
post efficiency is also closely related to implemeting a random assignment with
respect to discrete Pareto optimal assignments.
If one is able to compute an SD-efficient assignment [13], then the question
arises that why should we bother with a less demanding notion of efficiency?
There are a number of reasons why implementation of ex post assignments
and testing ex post efficiency is important. Firstly, the algorithm to test SD-
efficiency of a random assignment cannot be used to test weaker notions of
efficiency. Secondly, in many scenarios, a random assignment may be given a
priori because of various constraints and hence may not be SD-efficient. For
example, the random assignment could be a result of an already decided time
sharing agreement. Such a random assignment may need to be implemented in
any case and would preferably be implemented via Pareto optimal deterministic
assignments. For example, agents may already have a time sharing assignment
in place and one may want to know whether it can be achieved by randomizing
over deterministic Pareto optimal assignments. Thirdly, there may already be
simple strategyproof method such as the uniform assignment rule in place where
each agent gets 1/n of each object.1 One may want to implement the uniform
assignment via a convex combination of Pareto optimal assignments even if it
may not be SD-efficient. We also note that SD-efficiency is incompatible with
strategyproofness when also requiring anonymity [13]. Finally, the convex hull of
deterministic Pareto optimal assignments is an interesting mathematical object
and testing ex post efficiency of a random assignment is equivalent to checking
whether a given assignment is in the convex hull. The problem has important
connections with optimizing linear functions over this convex hull.
Contributions. We first examine the problem of checking whether a given ran-
dom assignment is ex post efficient and obtain insights into why the problem
may be computationally challenging. We show that whereas computing an ex
post efficient assignment is easy, checking whether a given random assignment
is ex post efficient is NP-complete. Hence implementing a given random as-
signment via deterministic Pareto optimal assignments is NP-hard. Even if it
is known that a random assignment is ex post efficient, finding its Pareto opti-
mal decomposition is NP-hard. Our result also implies that optimizing over the
convex hull of Pareto optimal assignments is NP-complete.
We formalize a new efficiency concept called robust ex post efficiency that
is weaker than SD-efficiency but stronger than ex post efficiency. A character-
ization of robust ex post efficiency is also presented. Previously, characterizing
SD-efficiency has already attracted considerable interest [see e.g., 2, 5, 13]. We
show that robust efficiency can be checked in polynomial time if there are a
constant number of agent types.
We highlight that the well-known random serial dictatorship mechanism [8]
is not robust ex post efficient. Our finding strengthens the observation of Bo-
1The uniform assignment also satisfies other properties such a probabilistic consistency [15]
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gomolnaia and Moulin [13] that random serial dictatorship is not SD-efficient.
We show that whereas robust ex post efficiency is combinatorial, ex post
efficiency is not. The finding that ex post efficiency is not combinatorial also
contrasts with the fact that in randomized voting, ex post efficiency of a lottery
simply depends on its support.
Table 1 summarizes some of the results.
Ex post efficiency Robust ex post efficiency SD-efficiency
Complexity of verification
NP-complete in coNP, in P for const # agent types in P
(Theorem 2) (Remark 4), (Lemma 1) (Theorem 1, [5])
Combinatorial
no yes yes
(Theorem 3) (Theorem 8) (Lemma 3, [13])
Table 1: Summary of results and related work.
1. Preliminaries
Assignment setting. An assignment problem is a triple (N,O,%) such that N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , on} is the set of objects, and the
preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies for each agent i his preferences %i
over objects in O. We write a %i b to denote that agent i values object a at least
as much as object b and use i for the strict part of %i, i.e., a i b iff a %i b
but not b %i a. We will assume that the agents have strict preferences and that
o1 i o2 · · · , on is represented by a comma separated list as follows:
i : o1, o2, . . . , on
Example 1 (Assignment Problem). Consider an assignment problem in which
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, O = {o1, o2, o3, o4} and the preferences % are as follows.
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o1, o2, o3, o4
3 : o2, o1, o4, o3
4 : o2, o1, o4, o3
A random assignment p is a (n × n) matrix [p(i)(oj)] such that p(i)(oj) ∈
[0, 1] for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, ;
∑
i∈N p(i)(oj) = 1 for all oj ∈ O; and∑
oj∈O p(i)(oj) = 1 for all i ∈ N . The value p(i)(oj) represents the probability
of object oj being allocated to agent i. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(o1), . . . , p(i)(on))
represents the allocation of agent i. The set of columns correspond to the objects
o1, . . . , on. A feasible random assignment is deterministic if p(i)(o) ∈ {0, 1} for
all i ∈ N and o ∈ O. A uniform assignment is a random assignment in which
each agent has probability 1/n-th of getting each object.
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Example 2 (Random assignment). For and assignment problem in which
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}, the following is an example of a random
assigment:
p =

5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
 .
In p, the probability of agent 1 getting o3 is 5/12.
Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) %SDi q(i) i.e., an agent i
SD prefers allocation p(i) to allocation q(i) if∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
p(i)(oj) ≥
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
q(i)(oj) for all o ∈ O.
An assignment p is SD-efficient is there exists no assignment q such that
q(i) %SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) SDi p(i) for some i ∈ N . An assignment
is ex post efficient if it be can represented as a probability distribution over the
set of Pareto optimal assignments.
We say that a deterministic assignment q is consistent with a random as-
signment p if for each q(i)(o) = 1, we have that q(i)(o) > 0. A deterministic
assignment can be represented by a permutation matrix in which an entry of
one denotes the row agent getting the column object. A decomposition of a
random assignment p is a sum
∑k
i=1 λiPi such that λi ∈ (0, 1] for i ∈ {1, . . . , k},∑k
i=1 λi = 1, and each Pi is a permutation matrix (consistent with p).
Example 3 (Decomposition of a random assignment). Consider a random as-
signment 
1/3 1/3 1/3 0
1/3 1/3 0 1/3
1/3 0 2/3 0
0 1/3 0 2/3

Then, the following is a valid decomposition of the assignment.
1
3

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
+ 13

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
+ 13

0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 .
Fact 1. A deterministic assignment is Pareto optimal iff it is ex post efficient
iff it is SD-efficient.
Therefore both SD-efficiency and ex post efficiency are natural generaliza-
tions of Pareto optimality in the context of random assignments. The convex
hull of Pareto optimal discrete assignments will be denoted by P.
An efficiency concept X is combinatorial if for any two random assignments
p and q such that q(i)(o) > 0 if and only if p(i)(o) > 0, it holds that p is efficient
with respect to X if and only if q is efficient with respect to X.
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Insights into ex post efficiency. Before we examine ex post efficient random as-
signment, we review some characterizations of deterministic Pareto optimal as-
signments. The first characterization is with respect to deterministic assignment
algorithm called serial dictatorship which takes as a parameter a permutation pi
over the set of agents. Serial dictatorship Prio(N,O,%, pi) lets the agents in the
permutation pi serially take their most preferred object that has not yet been
allocated until each agent has an object.
Fact 2 (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1]). Each Pareto optimal assignment is
an outcome of applying serial dictatorship with respect to some permutation of
the agents.
It follows that RSD (random serial dictator) rule which takes some pi uni-
formly at random and then implements serial dictatorship with respect to it is
ex post efficient.
The next characterization of Pareto optimal is graph-theoretical. For an
assignment problem (N,O,%) and deterministic assignment p, the corresponding
graph (V,E) is such that V = N ∪O and E is defined as follows. For all i ∈ N
and all o ∈ O,
• (o, i) ∈ E iff p(i)(o) = 1 and
• (i, o) ∈ E iff o i o∗ where p(i)(o∗) = 1.
Fact 3. An assignment is Pareto optimal if and only if its corresponding graph
does not admit a cycle.
The cycle is referred to as a trading cycle because it represents a trade of
objects in which each agent in the cycle gets the object that he was pointing
to [see e.g., 10]. We will use both Facts 2 and 3 in our arguments.
Remark 1. An ex post efficient assignment can be computed in polynomial
time. An outcome of serial dictatorship is ex post efficient. If we also require
anonymity, then a maximum utility matching for utilities consistent with the
ordinal preferences is also SD-efficient and hence ex post efficient.
Remark 2. An ex post random assignment can have multiple Pareto optimal
decompositions. Consider three agents with identical preferences. It can even
be the case that an ex post efficient lottery can be expressed by a lottery over
Pareto dominated assignments [Example 2, 2].
2. Ex post efficiency
We consider the problem of testing ex post efficiency of a random assign-
ment. Since we are interested in checking whether a random assignment can
be decomposed into Pareto optimal assignment, we are reminded of Birkhoff’s
algorithm that can decompose any given random assignment (represented by a
bistochastic matrix) into a convex combination of at most n2−n+ 1 determin-
istic assignments (represented by permutation matrices) [18].
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Birkhoff’s Algorithm. Birkhoff’s algorithm works as follows. We initialize i
to 1. For a bistochastic matrix M , a permutation matrix Pi with respect
to M is guaranteed to exist. M is set to M − λ1Pi where λi ∈ (0, 1) is
such that no entry M − λiPi is negative but there is at least one extra
zero entry in M − λPi than in M . Index i is incremented by one. The
updated M is again bistochastic. The process is repeated (say k − 1 times)
until M is the zero matrix. Then M =
∑k
i=1 λiPi. When Birkhoff’s algo-
rithm identifies a permutation matrix Pi, multiplies it by a constant and
then subtracts it from the input matrix representing the random assignment,
we will refer to such a step as decomposing with respect to a permutation matrix.
If a random assignment is SD-efficient, then any decomposition of the as-
signment is a decomposition into Pareto optimal deterministic assignments. On
the other hand, if a random assignment is not SD-efficient, it may not admit a
decomposition into Pareto optimal deterministic assignments. One may wonder
whether we can modify Birkhoff’s algorithm to check whether a given random
assignment is ex post efficient or not. Note that if we decompose with respect
to some permutation matrices, then we can decompose in any order.
We first show that checking whether there exists a Pareto optimal permu-
tation matrix that can be used to further decompose an assignment is NP-
complete.
Theorem 1. Checking whether there exists a Pareto optimal deterministic as-
signment consistent with the given random assignment is NP-complete.
Proof. The following problem is NP-complete: SerialDictatorshipFeasibil-
ity — check whether there exists a permutation of agents for which serial dicta-
torship gives a particular object to an agent [22]. We present a reduction from
SerialDictatorshipFeasibility to the problem of checking whether there ex-
ists a Pareto optimal deterministic assignment consistent with the given random
assignment Consider a random assignment p in which agent i gets o with prob-
ability one and all other agents gets each object in O \ {o} with non-zero prob-
ability. We argue that SerialDictatorshipFeasibility has a yes instance if
and only if p admits a Pareto optimal deterministic assignment consistent with
it.
If there exists a Pareto optimal deterministic assignment consistent with p,
then this implies that there exists a Pareto optimal assignment in which i gets
o. This means that there exists some permutation pi such that Prio(N,O,%
, pi)(i)(o) = 1.
Assume that there exists some permutation pi such that Prio(N,O,%
, pi)(i)(o) = 1. Then the deterministic assignment corresponding to
Prio(N,O,%, pi) is a Pareto optimal permutation matrix that is consistent with
p.
The statement above does not imply that checking whether a random as-
signment is ex post efficient is NP-complete. It is even not clear whether testing
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ex post efficiency of a random assignment is in NP. The reason is that the cer-
tificate for membership may not in principle be polynomial-sized. However, we
show that verifying an ex post efficient random assignment is in NP but the
problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 2. Testing ex post efficiency of a random assignment is NP-complete.
Proof. We first show that testing ex post efficiency of a random assignment is in
NP. It is sufficient to show that an ex post efficient random assignment admits
a polynomial-sized Pareto optimal decomposition. Consider the n2 dimensional
Euclidean space of all n × n matrices. Let P denote the minimal polytope
containing all determinisitc Pareto optimal allocations. By definition P is the
set of all ex post efficient allocations. Carathodory’s theorem implies that any
ex post efficient allocations must be a convex combination of no more than n2+1
deterministic Pareto optimal allocations (because all vertices in P are Pareto
optimal allocations).2
We prove the NP-hardness via a reduction from 3-SAT. Given a 3-SAT
instance F = (X,C), where X = {x1, . . . , xk} is the set of binary variables and
C = {C1, . . . , Ct} is the set of clauses. Let each clause Cj = lj,1∨lj,2∨lj,3, where
for s = 1, 2, 3, lj,s is either xjs or ¬xjs with j1 < j2 < j3. The assumption that
j1 < j2 < j3 will be crucial in the proof.
Given a 3-SAT instance F , we build an assignment problem (N,O,) as
follows.
Let N1 = ∪ki=1{xi, x1i , . . . , xti} ∪ {c, c1, . . . , ct}. For each agent x ∈ N1,
let dx denote the corresponding dummy agent. Let N2 = {dx : x ∈ N1}
and N = N1 ∪ N2. That is, N = ∪ki=1{xi, x1i , . . . , xti, dxi , dx1i , . . . , dxti} ∪{c, c1, . . . , ct, dc, dc1 , . . . , dct}. We will show that in the decompositions cj ’s are
“copies” of c and xji ’s are “copies” of xi.
O = {+x,−x : ∀x ∈ N1}. For each x ∈ N1, p(x,+x) = p(x,−x) =
p(dx,+x) = p(dx,−x) = 1/2.
To define the preferences of the agents, we first introduce the following no-
tation. For any literal lj,s in clause j, we let V (lj,s) denote the item that
corresponds to the value of xjs that fails lj,s. More precisely,
V (lj,s) =
{
+xji if lj,s = ¬xi
−xji if lj,s = xi
For each j ≤ t and Cj = lj,1∨lj,2∨lj,3, where lj,s is a literal of variable xjs , we
let Sjj1 = {V (lj,2)}, Sjj2 = {V (lj,3)}, and Sjj3 = {+cj}. For any i ≤ k and j ≤ t,
if Sji is not defined above then S
j
i = ∅. Moreover, we let S = {V (lj,1) : ∀j ≤ t}.
For example, for k = 5, t = 2, C1 = x2 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ x5, and C2 = ¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4,
we have
2The polytope actually lives in a n2 − 2n + 1 dimensional subspace of Rn2 because its
feasible points has to satisfy 2n equality constraints and one of which is redundant.
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S12 = {+x14}, S14 = {−x15}, S15 = {+c1}
S22 = {−x23}, S23 = {−x24}, S24 = {+c2}
S = {−x12,+x22}
Agents’ preferences are defined in two tables: preferences for x’s are in Ta-
ble 2 and preferences for all c’s are in Table 3.
xi : +xi,+x
1
i , . . . ,+x
t
i,−xi, others
dxi : +xi,−xi, others
∀j ≤ t, xji :
{
Sji ,−xji ,−xi,+xji , others if xi ∈ Cj
−xji ,−xi, Sji ,+xji , others if xi 6∈ Cj
∀j ≤ t, dxji : −x
j
i ,+x
j
i , others
Table 2: Preferences for x’s.
c : S,+c,+c1, . . . ,+ct,−c, others
dc : +c,−c, others
cj : −cj ,−c,+cj , others
dcj : −cj ,+cj , others
Table 3: Preferences for c’s.
Because for any x ∈ N1, +x and −x are assigned to agents x and dx in p
with probability 1, if p is ex post efficient, then for any deterministic Pareto
optimal assignment in the decomposition of p, +x and −x must be assigned
to x and dx. Therefore, for any such assignment M , we say that the sign of x
(respectively, dx) is positive, if +x is allocated to x (respectively, dx); otherwise
the sign is negative.
Claim 1. If p is ex post efficient, then in any deterministic Pareto optimal
assignment M in the decomposition of p,
(i) for all x ∈ N1, the sign of x is different from the sign of dx;
(ii) the sign of c is the same as the sign of cj for all j ≤ t;
(iii) for all i ≤ k, the sign of xi is the same as the sign of x1i , . . . , xti.
Proof. Part 1 follows after the fact that in M , +x and −x must be assigned to
x and dx.
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For part 2, suppose in M the sign of c is negative and the sign of cj is
positive, then c prefers +cj and cj prefers −c (see Table 3), which is a trading
cycle and contradicts the assumption that M is Pareto optimal. If in M the sign
of c is positive and the sign cj is negative for some j, then there exists another
deterministic Pareto optimal assignment M ′ where the sign of c is negative
and the sign of cj is positive. This is because the probability for positive and
negative signs for all agents are 1/2. Then, the same argument can be applied
M ′.
The proof for part 3 is similar.
In light of Claim 1 in the remainder of this proof, we sometimes only use
signs to represent the items, which will be clear from the context.
Suppose p is ex post efficient. We now show that there exists a solution to
the 3-SAT instance. Let M be any deterministic Pareto optimal assignment in
p’s decomposition where the sign of c is positive. In the SAT instance, we let
xi = + if and only if the sign of xi is positive in M (or equivalently, xi is assigned
item +xi). Suppose for the sake of contradiction a clause Cj = lj,1 ∨ lj,2 ∨ lj,3
is not satisfied, where lj,s corresponds to variable xjs . By part 2 of Claim 1,
V (lj,s) is allocated to xjs . Then, in M there exists a trading cycle illustrated
in Figure 1, which is a contradiction. In Figure 1 a1(o1) → a2(o2) means that
currently o1 (respectively, o2) is allocated to a1 (respectively, a2), and a1 prefers
o2 to o1. Specifically, for s = 1, 2, 3, if lj,s = xjs , then V (lj,s) = −xjjs , and xjs
prefers Sjjs to −xjjs (Table 2); similarly if lj,s = ¬xjs , then V (lj,s) = +xjjs , and
xjs prefers S
j
js
to +xjjs (Table 2).
Therefore, the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable.
c (+c)	

xj1 (V(lj,1)) xj2 (V(lj,2)) xj3 (V(lj,3)) 
dc (-c)	

cj (+cj)	

Figure 1: A trading cycle through an unsatisfied clause. a1(o1) → a2(o2) means that
currently o1 (respectively, o2) is allocated to a1 (respectively, a2), and a1 prefers o2 to
o1.
Suppose there exists a valuation v that satisfies F . We now construct a
decomposition of p to two deterministic Pareto optimal allocations M1 and M2.
M1 is illustrated in Table 4.
c = c1 = · · · = ct dc = dc1 = · · · = dct ∀i, xi = x1i = · · · = xti ∀i, dxi = dx1i = · · · = dxti
+ − v(xi) ¬v(xi)
Table 4: M1.
M2 is obtained from M1 by taking the negation of all signs. More precisely,
10
M2 is illustrated in Table 5. It is easy to check that p =
1
2M1 +
1
2M2. The
c = c1 = · · · = ct dc = dc1 = · · · = dct ∀i, xi = x1i = · · · = xti ∀i, dxi = dx1i = · · · = dxti
− + ¬v(xi) v(xi)
Table 5: M2.
demand graph of x’s is illustrated in Figure 2, where all outgoing edges of x’s
are shown (some incoming edges are not shown). We recall that an edge from
agent a1 to agent a2 means that a1 demand the item allocated to a2. (a)
represents the case for xi = + and (b) represents the case for xi = −. Dashed
lines in (b) means that it is valid if and only if xi is a literal in Cj .
c (+c)!
dc (-c)!
c1(+c1)! ct (+ct)!…"
S!
dc1 (-c1)! dct (-ct)!…"
xi (+xi)!
dxi  (-xi)!
xi1 (+xi1)! …"
dxi1 (-xi
1)! dxit (-xit)!…"
xit (+xit)!
Si1! Sit!
c (-c)!
dc (+c)!
c1(-c1)! ct (-ct)!…"
dc1 (+c1)! dct (+ct)!…"
xi (-xi)!
dxi  (+xi)!
xi1 (-xi1)! …"
dxi1 (+xi
1)! dxit (+xit)!…"
xit (-xit)!
…" S! …"
…" …" Si1! Si
t!…" …"
c (+c)!
dc (-c)!
c1(+c1)! ct (+ct)!…"
S!
dc1 (-c1)! dct (-ct)!…"
xi (+xi)!
dxi  (-xi)!
xi1 (+xi1)! …"
dxi1 (-xi
1)! dxit (-xit)!…"
xit (+xit)!
Si1! Sit!
c (-c)!
dc (+c)!
c1(-c1)! ct (-ct)!…"
dc1 (+c1)! dct (+ct)!…"
xi (-xi)!
dxi  (+xi)!
xi1 (-xi1)! …"
dxi1 (+xi
1)! dxit (+xit)!…"
xit (-xit)!
…" S! …"
…" …" Si1! Si
t!…" …"
(a) (b)
Figure 2: The demand graph of xi’s in M1 and M2. All outgoing edges of x
′s and
dummies are shown. In (b), Sji → xji if and only if xi ∈ Cj .
Claim 2. For all ≤ k and j ≤ t, xi, dxi and dxji are not involved in any trading
cycle.
Proof. For Figure 2 (a), no cycle can involve xi, dx1i , . . . , dxti because these agents
have their top items. Then, dxi cannot be in any cycle because its only outgoing
edge is to xi, which is not in any cycle.
For Figure 2 (b), no cycle can involve xi because the only agents who may
demand −xi are xji ’s with +xji (Table 2 and 3), but xji ’s get −xji ’s in Figure 2
(b). Also no cycle can involve dxi because she has her top item. For any j, if dxji
is involved in a cycle, then there is exactly one agent beyond xi who demands
+xji , who is the preceding agent in Cj (which can be another x
j
i′ or c). However,
if an agent demands +xji , then ¬xi ∈ Cj , which implies xi 6∈ Cj . Hence there
is no edge from xji to S
j
i in Figure 2 (b) (see Table 2). In this case x
j
i gets her
top item, and because the only outgoing edge of dji is from x
j
i , it is impossible
for dxji
to be involved in a trading cycle, which is a contradiction.
We establish that both M1 and M2 are Pareto optimal in the following two
claims.
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Claim 3. M1 is Pareto optimal.
Proof. The demand graph of c′s in M1 with all outgoing edges of c’s is illustrated
in Figure 3 (a).
(a) M1. (b) M2.
Figure 3: The demand graph of c’s in M1 and M2. All outgoing edges of c
′s and
dummies are shown.
Clearly for all j ≤ t, dcj is not in any cycle because they have no outgoing
edges. The only possibility of cycles are through c → dc → cj , then through
truncated Figure 2, where all xi and dxji
are removed. Because v satisfies F ,
each potential path from cj to c is blocked by at least one x
j
i . Meanwhile, there
is no cycle involving only xji ’s or involving x
j
i ’s with different j’s, because any
xji only has outgoing edges to S
j
i , which is either (1) empty, or (2) contains
another xji′ with i
′ > i (recall we assume that j1 < j2 < j3 for the three literals
in Cj) or +cj . This proves that M1 is Pareto optimal.
Claim 4. M2 is Pareto optimal.
Proof. The demand graph of c′s in M2 with all outgoing edges of c’s is illustrated
in Figure 3 (b). Clearly dc and all cj ’s are not in any cycle because they have
no outgoing edges. After they are removed, dcj ’s have no outgoing edges. c can
also be removed because none of the remaining agents demand −c. The only
remaining agents are those in the truncated Figure 2, where all xi and dxji
are
removed, and as in Claim 3, there is no cycle among them.
Corollary 1. Checking membership of a point in P is NP-complete.
Proof. Since P is a convex combination of Pareto optimal determistic assign-
ments, it contains all the ex post efficient points.
Corollary 2. Optimizing a linear functions over P is NP-complete.
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Proof. Since testing membership in P, the statements follows from the equiva-
lence between optimizing over a poltope and implementing a separation oracle
over over a polytope [16].
Although we have shown that testing whether a given assignment is ex post
efficiency is NP-complete, we leave open the case when the assignment is uni-
form.
We now show that in the random assignment problem, ex post efficiency is
not combinatorial.3 This is already a contrast with a stronger notion of effi-
ciency called SD-efficiency which depends solely on the support of the random
allocations. A trading cycle of size 2k is consistent with random assignment p
if it consists of k agents and k objects, each objects points to an agent, each
object to an agent in the cycle and the cycle satisfies the following constraints:
(a) p(i)(o) > 0 if object o points to the agent i, and (b) o′ i o if agent i points
to object o′. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [Lemma 3, 13] proved that a random
assignment is not SD-efficiency iff it admits a trading cycle consistent with it.
The fact that SD-efficiency is combinatorial follows from its characterization.
In contrast, ex post efficiency is not combinatorial.
Theorem 3. Ex post efficiency is not combinatorial.
Proof. Consider the following assignment problem.
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o1, o2, o3, o4
3 : o2, o1, o4, o3
4 : o2, o1, o4, o3
The following assignment p is a result of RSD and hence ex post efficient:
p =

5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
 .
Now consider the following assignment:
q =

1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
 .
Note that q is a random assignment such that q(i)(o) > 0 if and only if
p(i)(o) > 0. Then in each Pareto optimal matrix that can be used to decompose
3The notion of an efficiency concept being combinatorial was first discussed in [7]. However,
the setting was voting and not the random assignment problem. In voting, a lottery over
alternatives is ex post efficient iff the support consists of Pareto optimal alternatives. Hence
in voting, ex post efficiency is combinatorial.
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the assignment, due to Pareto optimality, agents 1 and 2 get an object each
from the following sets of objects {o1, o2}, {o1, o3}, and {o3, o4}. Agent 1 and 2
cannot get the set {o2, o4} in a Pareto optimal assignment because if it were the
case then there exists a serial dictatorship in which agent 3 or 4 take o1 before
o2 is allocated. In order for agent 1 to get 5/12 of o4, we need to use the 5/12
time the Pareto optimal assignment in which o4 gts 5/12. But this means that
agent 2 gets o3 5/12 of the time. But this is not possible since agent 2 gets o3
1/12 of time.
3. Robust ex post efficiency
In this section, we formalize a new efficiency concept called ex post efficiency.
Recall that a random assignment is ex post efficient if it can be represented as a
convex combination of Pareto optimal deterministic assignments. We say that
a random assignment is robust ex post efficient if any decomposition of the
assignment consists of Pareto optimal deterministic assignments. The following
is a useful characterization of robust ex post efficiency.
Deterministic Pareto optimality
Randomized SD-eff =⇒ robust eff =⇒ ex post eff
Figure 4: Efficiency concepts for deterministic and randomized assignment settings.
Theorem 4. An assignment is robust ex post efficient iff it does not admit a
non-Pareto optimal deterministic assignment consistent with it.
Proof. Assume that there exists no non-Pareto optimal deterministic assign-
ment consistent with the assignment p. Then each time, p is decomposed with
respect to a deterministic assignment, it is with respect to a Pareto optimal
deterministic assignment. By Birkhoff’s theorem, the updated p is still bis-
tochastic after the decomposition. Hence any decomposition of p is into Pareto
optimal deterministic assignment and hence p is robust ex post efficient.
Now let us assume that that there exists a non-Pareto optimal deterministic
assignment consistent with the assignment p. We then decompose p with respect
to such an assignment using Birkhoff’s algorithm and continue decomposing
it. Since the decomposition contains at least non Pareto optimal deterministic
assignment, hence p is not robust ex post efficient.
We point out that SD-efficiency implies robust ex post efficiency which im-
plies ex post efficiency. Note that in the general domain of voting, ex post
efficiency and robust ex post efficiency are equivalent.
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Theorem 5. SD-efficiency implies robust ex post efficiency which implies ex
post efficiency.
Proof. We first show that if an assignment is not ex post efficient, then it is
not robust ex post efficient. If an assignment q is not ex post efficient, then
there does not exist any decomposition of the assignment into Pareto optimal
deterministic assignments. Then q is not robust ex post efficient.
We now show that if an assignment is not robust ex post efficient, then it is
not SD efficient. If an assignment q is not robust ex post efficient, then there
exists at least one decomposition of q into deterministic assignments in which
at least one deterministic assignment is not Pareto optimal. But this implies
that there exists at least one deterministic assignment M consistent with q that
is not Pareto optimal. By Fact 3, M admits a trading cycle C. Since M is
consistent with q, each object o that points to an agent i in the cycle is such
that q(i)(o) > 0. Now consider a random assignment p which is the same as q
except that each agent i gets  probability less of the object that was pointing
to it and  probability more of the object he points to in cycle C. Assignment
q is such that p(i) %SDi q(i) for all i ∈ N and p(i) SDi q(i) for all i ∈ C. Hence
q is not SD-efficient.
SD-efficiency is a strictly stronger concept than robust ex post efficiency.
Although Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [2] did not explicitly define the concept
robust ex post efficiency, they showed that a random assignment that has only
one decomposition which is a randomization over Pareto optimal assignments
does not satisfy SD-efficiency. Hence robust ex post efficiency does not imply
SD-efficiency. Next, we show that ex post efficiency does not imply robust ex
post efficiency so that robust ex post efficiency is a strictly stronger concept
than ex post efficiency.
Remark 3. Consider the assignment problem assignment p in the proof of
Theorem 3. Assignment p which is the result of random serial dictatorship is ex
post efficient. However, there is a deterministic assignment M consistent with
p that is not Pareto optimal. Hence p is not robust ex post efficient.
Hence, we get the following.
Theorem 6. The random serial dictatorship mechanism may return an assign-
ment that is not robust ex post efficient.
The simple theorem above strengthens the observation of Bogomolnaia and
Moulin [13] that random serial dictatorship is not SD-efficient.
Theorem 7. Any robust ex post efficient point must lie on a face of the assign-
ment polytope where all extreme points of the face are vectors of Pareto optimal
assignments.
Proof. Suppose not, then there is a robust ex post efficient point x that is in the
interior of the assignment polytope. Then there is a  ball centered around x
that is contained in the polytope. Let p be an extreme point that is not Pareto
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optimal. Choose δ small enough such that y = x+δ(x−p) lies in the  ball. Then
one can write x as a convex combination of y and p. Moreover, since y belongs
to the assignment polytope, y can in turn be written as a convex combination
of vectors of assignments. Hence, we have expressed x as a convex combination
of extreme points of the assignment polytope and one of which is not a Pareto
optimal assignment. So x cannot be robust ex post efficient. Hence, any robust
ex post efficient must lie on a face of the assignment polytope. We can then use
the same argument to say that all extreme points of the face must correspond
to Pareto optimal assignments.
We can consider similar computational questions regarding robust ex post
efficiency: what is the computational complexity of checking whether an assign-
ment is robust ex post efficient? Our first observation is that the problem is in
coNP.
Remark 4. The problem of checking whether a random assignment is robust ex
post efficient is in coNP. By Theorem 4, any non-Pareto optimal deterministic
assignment consistent with the random assignment is a witness that the random
assignment is not robust ex post efficient. Also note that it can be checked in
linear time whether a given assignment is Pareto optimal (Fact 3).
Due to the characterization of robust efficiency in Theorem 4, the problem
of testing robust ex post efficiency is equivalent to checking whether there exists
a constrained non Pareto optimal assignment. Previously, it has been shown
that checking whether there exists a constrained Pareto optimal assignment is
NP-complete [22]. Next we give a simple necessary condition for robust ex post
efficiency.
Remark 5. If a random assignment is robust ex post efficient, there exists no
consistent deterministic assignment in which no agent gets his most preferred
object. The argument is as follows. For a random assignment p, it is sufficient
to show that if there exists a consistent deterministic assignment q in which no
agent gets his most preferred object, then that assignment is not Pareto optimal
and hence p is not robust ex post efficient. If no agent gets their most preferred
object, then there exists no permutation over the agents under serial dictatorship
returns p. Therefore, by Fact 2, q is not Pareto optimal. Hence by Theorem 4,
p is not robust ex post efficient.
Next, we show that robust ex post efficiency is combinatorial.
Theorem 8. Robust ex post efficiency is combinatorial.
Proof. If p is not robust ex post efficient, then there exists a deterministic
assignment r where p(i)(o) > 0 for r(i)(o) = 1 and r is not Pareto optimal.
Hence for deterministic assignment r, q(i)(o) > 0 for r(i)(o) = 1. Thus r is
not robust ex post efficient because it admits a Pareto dominated deterministic
assignment that is consistent with it. The same argument also shows that is q
is not robust ex post efficient, then p is not robust ex post efficient.
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In the previous section, we mentioned that the complexity of testing whether
the uniform assignment is ex post efficient is still open. On the other hand, it
can be easily checked whether the uniform assignment is robust ex post efficient.
Remark 6. The uniform assignment is robust ex post efficient if and only if
the preferences are unanimous. The arguments is as follows. If preferences
are unanimous then every assignment is Pareto optimal. If preferences are not
unanimous, then for some two objects o and o′, at least two agents have opposite
preferences over them. In this case, any assignment that gives each of o and o′
to one of the two agents who prefers it less is not Pareto optimal.
Two agents are said to of the same type if they have identical preferences.
We show that if there are a constant number agents, types, then robust ex post
efficiency can be checked in polynomial time.
Lemma 1. If there is a trading cycle consistent with random assignment that
contain multiple agents of the same type, then there also exists a Pareto cycle
consistent with the random assignment, in which there is at most one agent of
the same type.
Proof. We show that if there exists a Pareto cycle also containing c agents of
the same type, then there exists a Pareto cycle containing c − 1 agents of the
same type. Consider the Pareto cycle in which the c agents of the same type are
i1, . . . , ic where agent i1 is the agent who has the least preferred object pointing
to it among all the objects that point towards the c agents. Then agent i1 can
point directly to the object that agent i2 points to thereby forming a smaller
cycle only including i1, i3, . . . , ic.
Theorem 9. If there are a constant number of agent types, robust ex post
efficiency can be checked in polynomial time.
Proof. We will use the characterization of robust efficiency in Theorem 4 to
propose an algorithm. Since we will check for a Pareto dominated assignment,
by Fact 3, such an assignment admits a trading cycle consistent with the random
assignment. From Lemma 1, we know that if there is a trading cycle consistent
with the random assignment then there is also a trading cycle consistent with
the assignment in which there is at most one agent of one type. In order to check
for robust efficiency, we need to check whether there is a trading cycle for which
the agents outside the trading cycle are assigned an object each from outside the
trading cycle consistent with the random assignment. We will use the fact that
if there exists a trading cycle consistent with the assignment which contains
multiple agents of the same type and if the agents outside the trading cycle
are also perfectly matched to an object consistent with the random assignment,
then there exists a trading cycle consistent with the assignment which contains
at most one agent of each type and for which the agents outside the trading cycle
are also perfectly matched to an object consistent with the random assignment.
Note that are constant number
∑k
j=1
(
k
j
)× j! of possible orderings in which
agent types are present in a Pareto cycle in which there is at most one agent
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of the same type. For each of the agents types in the cycle, there may be O(n)
options of objects that point to him. For each agent type there are O(n) agents
that could be used for that type. Therefore, the number of Pareto cycles to be
considered is at most O(n2k) where in each Pareto cycle there are at most k
agents and k objects.
For each of the (short) Pareto cycles considered that are not more than
O(n2k), we need to check whether the other agents can be perfectly matched
to the unallocated objects. This can again be checked in polynomial time via
the algorithm to check whether a perfect matching exists for agents not in the
Pareto cycle.
It will be interesting to check whether there exists a fixed parametrized
algorithm with parameter number of agent types.
4. Conclusions
We examined different aspects of ex post efficiency of random assignments.
One of the most important technical result in the paper is that testing ex post
efficiency is NP-complete. The result contrast with the followings facts (1) ex
post stability in the two sided marriage setting can be tested in polynomial time
via an LP [24]; (2) SD-efficiency can be tested in polynomial time; and (3) an
ex post efficient assignment can be computed in polynomial time.
One implication of the NP-completeness result is that the set of ex post
efficient assignments cannot be characterized compactly. Unless P=NP, there
is no polynomial-time separation oracle for the convex hull of Pareto optimal
assignments. Due to the well-known equivalence of optimization and separation,
it follows that optimizing a linear function over the convex hull of Pareto optimal
assignments is NP-complete as well.4 Another corollary is that for the marriage
market model, testing ex post effiency is NP-complete because the assignment
setting can be viewed as a marriage market in which one side of the market is
completely indifferent.
We also showed that in the random assignment problem, robust ex post
efficiency is combinatorial whereas ex post efficiency is not. The finding that ex
post efficiency is not combinatorial contrasts with the fact that in randomized
voting, ex post efficiency of a lottery simply depends on its support.
A number of open problems arise as a result of this study. The complexity
of checking whether a random assignment is robust ex post efficient is open.
Similarly, for a constant number of agent types, the complexity of checking
whether a random assignment is ex post efficient is also open. Computational
aspects of Pareto optimal deterministic assignments have been studied in great
depth in recent years [3, 9, 19]. The more general randomized resource allocation
settings provide a suitable ground for further developments in the algorithmic
aspects of matching under preferences.
4The fact that optimizing a linear function over the convex hull of Pareto optimal assign-
ments is NP-complete also follows from [22].
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